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Metacognition and confidence:
comparing math to other academic
subjects
Shanna Erickson* and Evan Heit
Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, USA
Two studies addressed student metacognition in math, measuring confidence accuracy
about math performance. Underconfidence would be expected in light of pervasive math
anxiety. However, one might alternatively expect overconfidence based on previous
results showing overconfidence in other subject domains. Metacognitive judgments
and performance were assessed for biology, literature, and mathematics tests. In
Study 1, high school students took three different tests and provided estimates of
their performance both before and after taking each test. In Study 2, undergraduates
similarly took three shortened SAT II Subject Tests. Students were overconfident
in predicting math performance, indeed showing greater overconfidence compared
to other academic subjects. It appears that both overconfidence and anxiety can
adversely affect metacognitive ability and can lead to math avoidance. The results have
implications for educational practice and other environments that require extensive use
of math.
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Introduction
Two components of metacognition are particularly relevant for successful learning: self-
monitoring, e.g., assessing performance, and self-regulation, e.g., choosing what and how to study
(Nelson and Dunlosky, 1991; Thiede et al., 2003; Metcalfe, 2009). Metacognition has been found
to be crucial for calibration of self-knowledge of ability (Schunk and Ertmer, 2000; Sperling
et al., 2004), in domains and tasks such as mathematics (Pugalee, 2001), science (Schraw et al.,
2006), reading (Pressley, 2002), and writing (Pugalee, 2001). If people are unable to assess their
performance accurately, then it is unlikely that they will be able to learn optimally (see Townsend
and Heit, 2011, for a related argument). Any improvements in metacognition would allow learners
to better judge what they know and how well they will be able to learn information and recall it
later.
Our focus in the present research is self-monitoring in math. In addressing the topic of
metacognition and math, it is important to consider whether metacognition is domain-general or
domain-speciﬁc. In other words, to what extent are there general points to be made about people’s
metacognitive abilities, potential for error, and underlying mechanisms across subject domains,
and to what extent are there distinctive points to bemade for particular domains? Do the diﬃculties
that learners face with math reﬂect general issues with metacognition, or something special about
math?
Though there is ongoing debate on whether metacognition is domain-speciﬁc or
domain-general, there is no debate on the importance of metacognition in any learning
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process. In this paper we will focus primarily on possible
diﬀerences between metacognition in mathematics learning
when compared to other domains, asmath anxiety can aﬀect both
domain performance and metacognitive performance.
Based on past research, it remains unclear whether
metacognitive performance is similar across domains.
Metacognition research typically addresses a single subject
domain in isolation, and those few studies comparing
metacognition across domains have shown mixed results
(e.g., Veenman et al., 2006). Though these past studies have
used varying methodologies and assessments for measuring
metacognition, results still bear on this issue of domain
generality versus speciﬁcity and provide two views which we
must consider.
Domain-General Views of Metacognition
Some studies support domain generality of metacognition,
treating it as a skill that can be applied across diﬀerent
content areas (e.g., Schraw, 1996; Halpern, 1998; Veenman and
Verheij, 2001). In these cases, domain-general metacognitive
skills are distinguished from domain-speciﬁc knowledge. This
framework assumes that cognitive skills can be domain-
speciﬁc whereas metacognitive skills can be applied across
even unrelated domains. Interestingly, metacognitive ability
appears unrelated to IQ (Alexander et al., 1995). Rather,
metacognitive skills are assumed to improve along with domain
knowledge.
Metacognitive skills are further related to domain knowledge
in that metacognitive skill can aid learners those with low
ability or knowledge. For instance, Swanson (1990) showed
that metacognitive ability compensated for IQ in a comparison
between ﬁfth and sixth grade student problem solving ability.
Ability to solve problems was unrelated to IQ, while those with
higher metacognitive ability were better able to solve problems
than those with lower metacognitive ability. This result suggests
that metacognition can be applied ﬂexibly across tasks and thus
is a domain-general skill.
This domain-general view of metacognition is consistent
with the unskilled and unaware phenomenon, in which people
show domain-general overconﬁdence in their abilities, with
low performers showing greater overconﬁdence than higher
performers (Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Dunning et al., 2003).
This phenomenon has been shown for students predicting
performance on laboratory tests ranging from logical reasoning
to grammatical knowledge and sense of humor. Studies with
academic content in classroom settings also exhibit this
phenomenon (Maki and Berry, 1984; Miller and Geraci, 2011).
Miller and Geraci (2011) also demonstrated that the lowest
performers were overconﬁdent in exam score predictions, but
they were also less conﬁdent in these predictions than were the
highest performers. Thus, although the unskilled might be more
aware than once thought, they still demonstrate overconﬁdence
nonetheless. Furthermore, while people with high performance
might demonstrate slight underconﬁdence, people with lower
performance have even more exaggerated overconﬁdence. From
this, one might predict that students who are struggling in math
are particularly overconﬁdent.
Domain-Specific Views of Metacognition
In contrast, some investigations of individual diﬀerences in
metacognition point toward domain speciﬁcity. For example,
Kelemen et al. (2000) found that metamemory accuracy was
task speciﬁc for university students. They tested memory
monitoring performance across four metacognitive tasks: ease
of learning judgments for Swahili-English word pairs, feeling
of knowing judgments for general knowledge questions,
judgments of learning for unrelated English word pairs, and
text comprehension monitoring for narrative texts. While
they found individual diﬀerences in memory and conﬁdence
that remained constant across tasks, individual diﬀerences in
metacognitive accuracy changed for each task. Glaser et al. (1992)
provided evidence that metacognition can diﬀer based on task.
They found that metacognitive strategies of university students
varied across discovery learning tasks. In their comparison
of several reasoning tasks, they further found variability in
metacognitive performance for components of problem solving.
There are a variety of alternative but equally successful problem
solving strategies and a variety of metacognitive approaches
for these problems. In general, successful problem solvers use
metacognitive strategies more often than less successful problem
solvers, but there is no one set of metacognitive strategies that
led to successful problem solving. They also found that domain
content and context led to variation in use of metacognitive
strategies, and that particular metacognitive skills were associated
with speciﬁc learning success or failure within particular domains
and contexts.
Still others have suggested that metacognition might be
domain-speciﬁc early in development, beginning as reﬂective
self-analysis of cognition. For example, Paris and Byrnes
(1989) suggest that such self-directed reﬂection develops in
children as self-corrections, and this behavior becomes more
prominent as children get older. As children develop self-
regulation for individual tasks, then gradually learn to apply
general self-correction skills across a variety of tasks. Similarly,
Karmiloﬀ-Smith (1992) suggested that this reﬂection results in
the restructuring of self-knowledge that increases theoretical
understanding of one’s cognition. This restructuring starts
to diﬀerentiate and separate various domains of knowledge.
Both these views support a theory of ﬁrst domain-speciﬁcity
of metacognition that eventually extends to be a domain-
general skill. Then as metacognitive skill improves, this skill
can be applied across a variety of domains. Veenman and
Spaans (2005) provided evidence for this in their ﬁndings of
ﬁrst domain-speciﬁcity in metacognitive skill in the ﬁrst year
of high school then domain generality later for third year
high school students. First-year and third-year students solved
math problems while thinking aloud and also performed an
inductive learning biology task. Metacognitive skillfulness was
measured based on enactment of metacognitive behaviors (e.g.,
entirely reading a problem statement, selection of relevant
information needed to solve the problem, monitoring the on-
going problem-solving process, checking the answer, reﬂecting
on the answer). A diﬀerence in metacognitive skillfulness
was observed when comparing the two groups of students
in that metacognitive skills are at ﬁrst domain-speciﬁc for
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ﬁrst-year students, while they are domain-general for third-year
students.
Previous research shows connections between metacognition
and math anxiety. Math anxiety (or math phobia) is a fear of
math that leads to math avoidance or lower math performance
(Ashcraft, 2002; Ashcraft and Krause, 2007). This sometimes
extreme anxiety is harmful in both educational and workplace
settings (Meece et al., 1990; Furner and Berman, 2003).
Performing math tasks in stressful situations, such as during
tests, only compounds math anxiety (Beilock and Carr, 2005;
Beilock, 2008). This anxiety can start early in children’s education,
with elementary school students already showing harmful eﬀects
of math anxiety on their math achievement (Ramirez et al.,
2013). Math anxiety interrupts cognitive processing through
its interference with working memory, and this is what can
cause people to show lower performance under pressure (Beilock
and Carr, 2005). While math anxiety does not appear to aﬀect
simple math tasks such as single digit addition, it does aﬀect
decision-making processes for number sense and any task
that required procedural aspects of arithmetic (Dehaene, 1997;
Ashcraft, 2002). The tasks requiring use of working memory
are adversely aﬀected by math anxiety. Students who are highly
math anxious tend to make more errors in timed problems
than did those with low math anxiety. This is also consistent
with Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) model of general anxiety
eﬀects, in which general anxiety disrupts working memory
through preoccupation with thoughts and attention given to
worry instead of to the current task. This preoccupation is a
second task that places a heavier load on working memory,
a component of cognition that is used in metacognition
(Shimamura, 2000).
The widespread evidence for math anxiety suggests the view
that math may be uniquely problematic compared to other
academic subjects. There does not seem to be a corresponding
body of evidence for, say, literature anxiety or even biology
anxiety. Generalizing this point, we would expect that if students
fear math, then they should generally have low conﬁdence in
math compared to other subjects and a corresponding diﬀerence
in metacognitive ability. Indeed, Ashcraft (2002) found evidence
for this point in terms of strong negative correlations between
math anxiety and self-conﬁdence in math.
Overview of Experiments
Accounts of domain speciﬁcity are consistent with the idea that
math is uniquely problematic. Contrasting this view that math is
unique are accounts of domain generality, including the unskilled
and unaware phenomenon. So are students underconﬁdent in
math, as would be expected from the math is unique view, or
are students overconﬁdent in math, as would be predicted by
the unskilled and unaware view? Note that we present these
as opposing views, but the predictions from these views were
derived by ourselves.
Our purpose is not to examine whether math-phobic students
are less conﬁdent than non-math-phobic students or whether
students are less conﬁdent in math than in other subjects. Rather,
we focus on calibration of metacognitive judgments, that is,
whether students are under- or over-conﬁdent relative to their
performance. In addition to general measures of calibration,
we also compared calibration across academic subjects. We
assessed both absolute calibration, in which we simply measure
how well subjective scores matched objective scores, as well as
relative calibration, assessing whether participants with higher
subjective scores had correspondingly higher objective scores.
Other than looking at conﬁdence for students with lower
versus higher scores, it was not our aim to examine individual
diﬀerences.
In two studies, we assessed conﬁdence in math as well as
other academic subjects (biology, literature). These studies were
conducted based on approval by the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for our institution (University of California, Merced). High
school (Study 1) and college (Study 2) students took standardized
tests and estimated their performance. Following the view that
math is unique, we would expect underconﬁdence in math
relative to the other subjects and likely worse metacognitive
calibration. In contrast, following the unskilled and unaware
view, we would expect similar overconﬁdence in math compared
to other subjects. In Study 2, we included a standard measure
of math anxiety. We note again that it was not our purpose
to examine individual diﬀerences in anxiety but rather to
look at students who were most likely math anxious overall,
and in general our ﬁndings are limited to the groups we
studied.
Study 1
Method
Participants in this study attended a summer program at a diverse
public high school in California. They made two estimates:
predictions (before each test) of their performance as well as
postdictions (after each test). Mutiple choice tests were adapted
from teachers’ materials used at that grade level in this school,
giving students a basis for making predictions, with even more
information when making postdictions.
Our main focus was to compare calibration of estimates about
math to the other two subjects. We also compared predictions
to postdictions, allowing us to determine if metacognitive
judgments improved after completing a test, as would be expected
from previous research (Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Dunning
et al., 2003).
Participants
There were 40 participants (25 female, 15male). All were students
(mean age = 15.27, SD = 0.55) at Central Valley High School
in Ceres, California, who took the study for extra credit in their
summer school class (Algebra 1). A majority of these students
had failed math the previous academic year. Ceres Uniﬁed School
District is located in a rural area; its student population is
72% Hispanic-Latino, 21% White-Caucasian, 3% Asian-Paciﬁc
Islander, 1% African American, and 3% of other ethnicity.
Materials and Procedure
Each participant took three computer-based tests (biology,
literature, mathematics, in randomized order), each test
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consisting of 15 questions with 15 min allowed per test.
Questions were normed so that the overall level of diﬃculty
across tests was comparable, to avoid ceiling and ﬂoor eﬀects
and to assure variance in scores. Questions left unﬁnished within
the allotted time were scored as incorrect. Participants were told
that these tests were similar to those from their current classes.
Question style was multiple choice with ﬁve answer choices.
Before each test, participants provided a predicted score (number
of questions correct) for how well they would do. After each
test, participants provided a postdicted score for how well they
thought they had performed. They were not told their actual
scores.
Results and Discussion
Key descriptive results are in Figure 1. The leftmost bar
for each category represents average predicted score, the
middle bar represents average actual test score, and the
rightmost bar represents average postdicted score. The
general pattern is that predictions are substantially greater
than actually performance, and postdictions are somewhat
greater than actually performance. This overconﬁdence is
particularly striking for predictions about math performance.
We do not show breakdown by gender, however, predicted,
actual, and postdicted scores averaged about 10% higher for
males.
First, we examined predictions in a three-way, predicted
versus actual score × academic subject × gender, ANOVA.
There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of predicted (mean = 61.7)
versus actual (mean = 43.0) score, F(1,38) = 54.45, MSE = 6.00,
η2 = 0.59, p < 0.0001, indicating overconﬁdence in predictions.
The academic subject variable did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance, F(2,152) = 4.14, MSE = 4.11, η2 = 0.05. However,
there was a signiﬁcant predicted versus actual score × academic
subject interaction, F(2,152) = 10.31, MSE = 4.11, η2 = 0.11,
p < 0.0001, implying that overconﬁdence diﬀered by academic
subject. Notably, participants showed the highest degree
of overconﬁdence in mathematics (predicted score = 62.0,
actual score = 38.9). There was also a main eﬀect of gender,
FIGURE 1 | Predicted, actual, and postdicted scores by domain.
Leftmost bars represent predicted scores, middle bars domain performance,
and rightmost bars postdicted scores, each with SE.
F(1,38) = 5.88,MSE = 17.41, η2 = 0.13, p< 0.05, but remaining
interaction terms were not statistically signiﬁcant, F < 1. Hence,
degree of overconﬁdence did not depend on gender, although it
may be that the sample size did not yield enough power to fully
address this point.
We also conducted a comparable analysis on postdicted scores
(mean = 47.5). In this three-way ANOVA, there was a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of academic subject, F(2,152) = 21.00, MSE = 4.06,
η2 = 0.21, p < 0.0001. Note that biology had the highest
values overall and mathematics had the lowest. There was also
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of gender, F(1,38) = 5.10, MSE = 19.74,
η2 = 0.12, p < 0.05. The remaining main eﬀect and interaction
terms were not statistically signiﬁcant, F < 1. Hence, we
did not see signiﬁcant overall overconﬁdence on postdictions,
and overconﬁdence did not depend on academic subject or
gender.
The preceding analyses focused on absolute calibration,
namely how well subjective scores matched objective scores, on
average. We next examined relative calibration, namely whether
participants with higher subjective scores had correspondingly
higher objective scores, measuring relative calibration in terms of
correlation coeﬃcient, r, across all participants (Table 1). Relative
calibration is particularly strong for math, and particularly weak
for literature, with biology falling between.
Correlations of estimates of performance were not signiﬁcant
across domains, suggesting that student metacognition was
not domain-general. We also tested diﬀerences in correlations
both across domain and within domain. Steiger z-tests of
independent correlations showed that the prediction versus
actual score correlations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between math
and literature (z = 2.28, p < 0.02). Similarly, postdiction versus
actual score correlations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between math
and literature (z = 2.36, p< 0.02). Williams t-tests of dependent
correlations reveal that diﬀerences between prediction versus
actual score and postdiction versus actual score are signiﬁcant
for all of biology (t = −3.19, p < 0.0029), literature (t = −3.13,
p < 0.0034), and math (t = −2.28, p < 0.028). Thus calibration
signiﬁcantly improved in postdictions on all tests when compared
to calibration of predictions.
Linear regression calibration curves also illustrate this point
(Figure 2). Regression lines that more closely follow the main
dashed line (perfect calibration) indicate better metacognitive
calibration for that academic subject. Regression lines for
biology and literature are shallow, showing little sensitivity
to actual performance. These lines show the usual unskilled
and unaware pattern of overconﬁdence at the lowest level of
performance and underconﬁdence at the highest level (Kruger
and Dunning, 1999; Dunning et al., 2003). Calibration for math
in this case seems to take unskilled and unaware one step
TABLE 1 | Correlations between participant-produced estimates and
performance by domain.
Biology Literature Math
Prediction versus actual score 0.32∗ 0.10 0.56∗∗∗
Postdiction versus actual score 0.39∗ 0.21 0.64∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (as compared to 0).
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FIGURE 2 | Regression lines for actual versus predicted scores by
academic subject. Regression lines that more closely follow the main
dashed line (perfect calibration) indicate better metacognitive calibration for
that academic subject.
further, in that even the high performers over-estimated their
ability.
In general, results more closely supported the unskilled and
unaware view rather than the math is unique view. Students were
generally overconﬁdent in all three academic subjects, at least
on predictions if not postdictions. The only evidence we found
suggesting a diﬀerence for math is that relative calibration for
math was actually the best and overconﬁdence was the greatest.
Overall performance was somewhat lower for female students
than for males, but so were predictions and postdictions, so their
overconﬁdence was no diﬀerent.
Study 2
We turn to another study, attempting to replicate and extend
key ﬁndings from Study 1, which might have been due
to idiosyncrasies of the particular student sample or test
instruments used. In Study 2, we conducted a similar study
on college students, using sample SAT test questions. We
would have expected high school students in Study 1 to
be math anxious, because most high school students show
some math anxiety (Hembree, 1990; Ma, 1999; Maloney and
Beilock, 2012), and most of the students in our study had
previously failed math classes. In Study 2, we included a
standard measure of math anxiety adapted from a shortened
Math Anxiety Ratings Scale (MARS, Alexander and Martray,
1989). Although we did not directly measure math anxiety
for students in Study 1, we replicated this study within
the same school population the following summer, and the
average shortened MARS score was 77. This study also
included additional measures but otherwise replicated ﬁndings
from the high school study presented here. For comparison,
Ashcraft and Moore (2009) found an average shortened MARS
score of 61 across several college samples identiﬁed as math
anxious.
Method
Participants
There were 46 participants (28 female, 18 male) in this study. All
were UC Merced undergraduates (mean age = 19.96, SD = 1.75)
who received extra credit in their introductory psychology or
cognitive science classes for their participation. The UC Merced
undergraduate population is 40% Hispanic-Latino, 29% Asian-
Paciﬁc Islander, 17% White-Caucasian, 7% African American,
and 7% other ethnicity.
Materials and Procedure
Participants took three tests (biology, literature, mathematics),
each with 15 questions. Again, questions left unﬁnished within
the allotted time were scored as incorrect. Participants were
told that these were based on SAT II Subject Tests (which
most students have taken). Students completed three assessments
derived from past questions released by the College Board,
making predictions and postdictions as in Study 1. Test questions
were normed to avoid ceiling and ﬂoor eﬀects. Then, participants
answered 23 questions about math anxiety from a variant of the
shortened MARS (Alexander and Martray, 1989), using a rating
scale ranging from 1 – “no anxiety” to 5 – “very high anxiety,”
with possible scores from 23 to 115. (We dropped two of three
questions from the standardized shortened MARS with nearly
identical wording).
In pilot studies, in an eﬀort to design tests of equal
diﬃculty, items of comparable diﬃculty for each test were
selected using individual question ratings (easy, medium,
diﬃcult) provided by College Board. However, performance
ﬂoor eﬀects on the pilot math tests were so pronounced that
easier questions were substituted in an eﬀort to bring average
performance closer to the level as the literature and biology
tests.
Results and Discussion
The results largely replicated Study 1 (see Figure 3), most notably
in terms of general over-conﬁdence of predictions compared to
actual scores, most notably for math.
FIGURE 3 | Predicted, actual, and postdicted scores by domain.
Leftmost bars represent predicted scores, middle bars domain performance,
and rightmost bars postdicted scores, each with SE.
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In a three-way, predicted versus actual score × academic
subject × gender ANOVA, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of predicted (mean = 51.3) versus actual (mean = 40.4) score,
F(1,44) = 19.70, MSE = 9.31, η2 = 0.31, p < 0.0001, indicating
overconﬁdence in predictions. There was also a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of academic subject, F(2,176) = 7.19, MSE = 4.18,
η2 = 0.09, p < 0.0001; scores were lowest overall in math.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between these two variables,
F(2,176) = 29.58, MSE = 4.18, η2 = 0.22, p < 0.0001,
indicating that degree of overconﬁdence depended on academic
subject. Overconﬁdence was greatest in mathematics (predicted
score = 52.8, actual score = 28.3), however, we are careful
not to over-interpret the interaction because actual scores also
diﬀered by academic subject. The remaining main eﬀect (gender)
and interaction terms were not statistically signiﬁcant, F < 1.
Hence, the ﬁnding of overconﬁdence, particularly in math, did
not depend on gender.
We also conducted a comparable analysis on postdicted scores
(mean = 36.0) and actual scores. This ANOVA revealed a
main eﬀect of postdicted versus actual score, F(1,44) = 4.48,
MSE = 6.85, η2 = 0.09, p < 0.05, indicating that participants
were slightly yet signiﬁcantly underconﬁdent overall. With that
said, given the overall drop from predictions to postdictions,
we see this as reﬂecting that participants were better calibrated
after taking the test, as in Study 1. (A third ANOVA comparing
predicted and postdicted scores showed amain eﬀect of predicted
versus postdicted.) There was a main eﬀect of academic subject,
F(2,176) = 37.52, MSE = 3.70, η2 = 0.41, p < 0.0001.
There was also a signiﬁcant interaction between academic
subject and postdicted versus actual score, F(2,176) = 3.12,
MSE = 3.70, η2 = 0.02, p < 0.05, indicating a diﬀerence
in overconﬁdence by academic domain. Though all medium
and diﬃcult questions were removed and replaced with easy
ones (based on College Board question ratings), performance
remained lower for the math test compared to the other two
subjects. The remaining main eﬀect (gender) and interaction
terms were not statistically signiﬁcant, F< 4. Even after replacing
all questions with those rated as easy by the College Board, and
thus creating a minimally diﬃcult assessment that incorporated
actual SAT questions, math test scores were consistently lower
than biology or literature test scores. Analyses were also
conducted using a sample of these math questions by selecting
seven questions that participants scored best on. However, this
did not change our ﬁndings. Again as in Study 1, the ﬁnding
of overconﬁdence, particularly in math, did not depend on
gender.
Analyses of relative calibration (Table 2, Figure 4) yielded
results similar to Study 1. Correlations between predicted and
TABLE 2 | Correlations between participant-produced estimates and
performance by domain.
Biology Literature Math
Prediction versus actual score 0.01 0.12 0.47∗∗∗
Postdiction versus actual score 0.41∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.35∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (as compared to 0).
FIGURE 4 | Regression lines for actual versus predicted scores by
academic subject. Regression lines that more closely follow the main
dashed line (perfect calibration) indicate better metacognitive calibration for
that academic subject.
actual scores were highest for math, although, based on a Steiger
z-test of independent correlations, there was only a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in correlations between predicted and actual score for
biology and predicted versus actual score for math (z = 2.32,
p< 0.02). Correlations for postdicted scores were approximately
the same for all three academic subjects, and there were no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences among these correlations. Williams t-tests
of dependent correlations reveal that there were signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in predicted versus actual and postdicted versus
actual correlations for both literature (t = −3.21, p < 0.0025)
and biology (t = –3.82, p < 0.00042). Thus calibration was
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent before and after the test for both literature
and biology. However, this pair of correlations for math showed
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, hence there was a lack of evidence
for improved calibration in math. Again, the regression lines
for biology and literature showed overconﬁdence at the lowest
level of performance and underconﬁdence at the highest level,
revealing again the general unskilled and unaware pattern. In
contrast, students were simply overconﬁdent in general for
math.
Students were clearly math anxious overall, with an average
adapted shortened MARS score of 73/115 (SD = 16.8).
Comparatively, Ashcraft and Moore (2009) found an average
MARS score of 61/125 using a test instrument with two
more questions, across several college samples identiﬁed as
math anxious. Further analyses suggested that more anxious
participants had lower performance and lower levels of
overconﬁdence; however, inferential tests did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance. Therefore we simply conclude that students
generally experienced math anxiety. We measured a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.94 for the version of the shortenedMARSmath anxiety
that we used, indicating very good internal consistency. This
is comparable to the Cronbach alphas Plake and Parker (1982)
found for the original full-length 98-question MARS instrument
(α = 0.97) as well as the shortened 24-question version MARS-R
(α = 0.98).
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Overall, the results were consistent with the unskilled and
unaware view, in that there was global overconﬁdence in
predictions across subject domains. The ﬁnding that even the
students who performed best in math were overconﬁdent (see
Figure 4) is not consistent with unskilled and unaware, however.
Instead of observing underconﬁdence in the best performers,
as has typically been displayed by the unskilled and aware
phenomenon, we see persisting overconﬁdence even in the
highest performing participants. In terms of math being unique,
it was unique here in the sense that overconﬁdence was the
greatest and metacognitive calibration was the best. Neither of
these results would be predicted from the idea that anxiety is
particularly high for math.
General Discussion
Our basic conclusion is that students aligned in some ways
to both the unskilled and unaware phenomenon and the idea
that math is unique. In both studies, students over-estimated
their performance in their predicted scores for all domains,
though their calibration did improve for postdictions. This
provides support for the domain generality of metacognition
under the unskilled and unaware view. Interestingly, the most
exaggerated over-conﬁdence was observed for math, which
supports the view that math is unique and that metacognition
is domain-speciﬁc. What is novel about these results is that
students appear to be math anxious yet also overconﬁdent
in math. In addition, relative calibration of metacognition
for math was generally better than other academic subjects.
This overconﬁdence and greater metacognitive calibration
replicated in both studies in this paper, and has also been
consistent across our earlier studies (Erickson and Heit,
2013). We have reliably documented over past studies that
both high school and college students have over-predicted
their scores on math tests, along with biology and literature
tests.
Math is indeed unique in some respects and this manifests
in an interesting way. Rather than showing lower conﬁdence
in math compared to other subjects and poorer metacognition,
as would be expected based on the original view that math
is unique, students generally showed the highest level of
overconﬁdence in math compared other academic subjects.
Students, rather than displaying diﬀering metacognition in the
form of lower conﬁdence stemming from math anxiety, instead
showed diﬀering metacognition in the form of even more
exaggerated overconﬁdence despite the presence of math anxiety.
In Study 1, students were retaking only their Algebra 1 class, not a
literature or a biology class. Whereas we did not directly measure
math anxiety in this study, it is plausible that these students were
math anxious overall.
Another relatively novel feature of these two studies is
the consideration of both predictions and postdictions of
performance, rather than just postdictions or individual test
item evaluations. Math was unique in that students displayed
higher over-conﬁdence when compared to other subjects, and
this persisted in both predictions and postdictions. Students also
displayed elements of being unskilled and unaware both before
and after the test, though their calibration did improve after
taking a test. It seems an obvious result that metacognition would
improve after students take a test, and it is tempting to treat
postdictions as the more relevant measure to be considered when
evaluating actual studentmetacognition. After all, doing so would
help in comparing metacognition across students once they have
equal footing in knowing exactly what is on the test. However,
we would argue that predictions, not postdictions, provide a
more realistic and practical measure of student metacognition.
Students typically cannot view actual questions before they take
a test in an academic setting. Rather, they must use predictions
to guide their self-regulation activities, including studying as well
as choices such as how to take notes in class (or even whether
to attend class). Students’ metacognitive skill in postdicting
performance after a test might be more accurate, but this
cannot help them to improve test performance and academic
success.
As noted earlier, our ﬁndings are focused on the math-
anxious student groups studied here, comparing academic
subjects. We would see a comparison to non-math-anxious
students as a fascinating but challenging potential topic for
future research. Just assembling two groups of students who
diﬀer in terms of math anxiety but are equal on other
variables would present considerable diﬃculty. Students who
diﬀer in math anxiety likely have other attributes (e.g.,
demographics, math ability) that also diﬀer. These variables
would have to be carefully teased apart in order to make
any comparisons of math-anxious and non-math-anxious
students.
Possible Mechanisms
It was not the purpose of these studies to ﬁnd the exact
mechanisms that underlie metacognitive function for math.
In general, ﬁnding a similar pattern of results for two
diﬀerent tasks does not necessarily indicate that they are
the same mechanistically. However, theories in the math
anxiety literature help explain why metacognition for math is
unique when compared to other academic domains. Notably,
Beilock (2008) along with others (Ramirez et al., 2013)
has shown that working memory is compromised by math
anxiety and also by stressful situations, providing a possible
explanation for the reduced metacognitive ability we observed
for math. Ashcraft and Krause (2007) further showed that
math anxiety and peoples’ preoccupation with this fear function
as secondary mental tasks that draw on working memory
resources necessary for problem solving. Any math problem
solving that requires more than simple retrieval of information
depends on working memory, so a reduction in working
memory capacity can lead to a reduction in math performance.
This lower performance then results in a disconnect between
typical academic performance and math performance and
a corresponding miscalibration in metacognition. People’s
metacognitive evaluation of math ability may ordinarily be
more accurate when they are engaging in tasks in a less
stressful environment but becomes less accurate when put under
pressure.
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So far, we have demonstrated overconﬁdence as a ﬂaw
in self-monitoring about math and other domains. Self-
monitoring strategies such as self-testing give learners speciﬁc
and measureable feedback about how much they know. Without
accurate feedback, learners are unable to select appropriate self-
regulation strategies to further their learning process (Dunlosky
et al., 2005). Rather, they choose study strategies based on
feelings of knowing and judgments of learning, both of which
have been shown to be inaccurate self-measures of knowledge
(Metcalfe and Finn, 2008). These inaccurate measures lead to
student ﬂaws in identifying problem areas of knowledge. Without
knowing what they do not understand, learners are unable to
make plans to ﬁll in gaps in their knowledge. Students can
beneﬁt from using eﬀortful self-monitoring by enacting practice
tests at home, where they might not suﬀer as much detraction
from working memory stores. With less stress from a testing
environment, they will be able to perform closer to their actual
knowledge level. This enables learners to highlight gaps in their
knowledge and use this to organize their study time more
eﬀectively.
Possible Limitations
We do not know to what extent these ﬁndings generalize
to other populations. Both UC Merced and Central Valley
High School are both in the same rural area of California
and are not necessarily representative of all learners. Ideally,
additional studies will be conducted in other learning settings
and with more widely diﬀering populations. For instance,
populations representing a full spectrum of math anxiety
would provide a more complete picture for the relationship
between math anxiety and metacognition, though such research
would also need to be take account of general anxiety,
math ability, and other variables related to math anxiety and
metacognition.
Students in Study 2 were math anxious, and although we
did not directly measure math anxiety in Study 1, a later study
identiﬁed another sample of the same high school population
as math anxious using the same MARs measure. From this, we
might assume that the students in Study 1 had a similar level
of math anxiety. Although we did not include a measure of
general anxiety, it is also possible that the populations here had
general anxiety and not just math anxiety. Presence of generally
high anxiety would further compromise working memory and,
consequently, metacognitive ability.
Although performance was not exactly the same across
academic subjects, it does not appear that the exaggerated
overconﬁdence in math was simply result of choosing
intrinsically more diﬃcult test items compared to biology
and literature. Questions in both studies were normed for
diﬃculty, and the math test in Study 2 was in fact less
diﬃcult than either biology or literature, based on test item
diﬃculty ratings provided by the College Board, creators of
the standardized test. Furthermore, analyses that included
only those questions that participants performed best on still
displayed this ﬁnding of exaggerated overconﬁdence. In an
eﬀort to improve the realism of this study, a later version of this
study was performed in math classes at UC Merced. Students
provided predictions and postdictions for class midterms, thus
utilizing a much more realistic assessment than an SAT II
test taken in a lab setting. Findings generally replicated those
from the studies in this paper, so results in this paper were
not an artifact of lab setting or the particular assessments
used.
Final Remarks
We do not doubt that math anxiety exists. However, it
is important to diﬀerentiate metacognitive judgments of
performance from feelings of anxiety, which may have a
more emotional or physical, rather than cognitive, basis. That
students can be anxious yet overconﬁdent has pernicious
implications for struggling math learners. Overconﬁdence
and anxiety provide students with two reasons to avoid
studying math or attending math classes. According to models
of metacognition, learners stop studying when believe they
have reached mastery (Son and Sethi, 2010). Furthermore,
extensive evidence shows that anxiety leads to avoidance
(Ashcraft, 2002), implying that anxious students would avoid
attending math classes. Other examples of math avoidant
behaviors include avoiding lectures, avoiding homework,
avoiding study time, or avoiding test preparation. Globally, the
2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
study, which assessed 15–16 year olds in 65 countries, found
that students with higher math anxiety were more likely to
have lower math self-concept. Trends in this comprehensive
study point toward increases in math anxiety over the past
decade.
Metacognition can also further impact other abilities such
as attention, memory, perception, comprehension, reasoning,
and problem solving (Kitchener, 1983; Metcalfe and Shimamura,
1994) and also aﬀect social behavior (Jaccard et al., 2005) and
decision making (Cohen et al., 1998). We have not yet examined
the eﬀects of math conﬁdence onmath anxiety on self-regulation.
Which is a better predictor of study behavior, math conﬁdence
or math anxiety? Would pointing out the contradiction between
being overconﬁdent about math and being anxious about it have
beneﬁcial consequences for struggling students? We see these
questions as important for future research.
We ﬁnish with a cautionary note. Some educational
interventions aim to boost students’ math self-conﬁdence,
because math self-concept is strongly related to math grades
(Marsh et al., 2006). It is important to keep in mind that students’
conﬁdence in their math performance is probably already high,
likely contributing to math avoidance. Aiming to further increase
self-conﬁdence in math may have unintended consequences for
learning.
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